Is Australia about to crash through its economic 'speed limit'?

Recent data has complicated the task of the RBA.  Stronger growth, a resilient labour market, rising house prices and an inflation surprise in the September quarter have taken rate cuts off the table and raised the risk of hikes in 2026.

Never count your chickens

Until a few months ago, the RBA was sitting pretty.  It looked like they had achieved their goal of delivering a ‘soft landing’.  Growth was improving, thanks to a more confident consumer and rising house prices.  The tight labour market was moving back into balance and wages growth was easing; all without a sharp rise in unemployment.  And trimmed mean inflation was back in the target band and forecast to land at 2.6%, even assuming two or three more interest rate cuts in this cycle.

Today, the picture looks far more complicated.  Inflation surprised us all in the September quarter (chart 1).  The trimmed mean CPI jumped by 1.0% in the quarter (here).  Unemployment spiked to 4.5% in September, but then quickly backtracked to 4.3%, with a strong 42.2K new jobs created in October.  And house prices have accelerated more rapidly than expected, led by surging investor demand and support for first home buyers.

This has complicated the interest rate outlook and raises difficult questions for the RBA Board heading into 2026.  The RBA didn’t give much away in its November Statement — maintaining their cautious approach.  Their updated forecasts built in the September inflation surprise and flowed through a little more price pressure into the December quarter (we estimate they now have a trimmed mean forecast of 0.8%/qtr in Q4 25, up from 0.6%).

More important was the recent speech by Deputy Governor Hauser (here) which gave a clear indication that the RBA is worried about the starting point for this cyclical upswing and the implications for interest rate policy.

Two roads diverged…

As Hauser articulated in his speech, there are two alternate ways of looking at the current economic picture (and one future scenario).

• On one view of the economy, monetary policy is still restrictive, the economy is growing below potential, the labour market is broadly back in balance (and softening), wages growth is easing, and the spike in inflation is largely driven by temporary factors.

In this world, we should see inflation ease back again over coming months, and the annual rate fall back towards the middle of the target band through 2026 and 2027.  Unemployment could rise a little further. This would likely see at least one rate cut in 2026.

• On another view of the economy, monetary policy is no longer restrictive, financial conditions are loosening, demand is lifting strongly and starting to hit supply constraints, real unit labour costs are still too high, and the inflation surprise was more persistent, owing to demand outpacing supply.

In this world, inflation should continue to run a bit hot into early 2026, the labour market will stabilise and again start to tighten, and, in time, this will feed into broader wage pressures.  This would bring rate hikes firmly onto the table in 2026.

Is inflation the ‘smoking gun’?

In our view, the spike in inflation in the September quarter does contain some signal.  But not enough to prove that demand is now outstripping supply across the broader economy.

Trent Saunders has recently unpacked the inflation surprise in more detail (here).  He found that roughly three‑quarters of the quarterly acceleration in headline inflation came from transitory price categories, while the remaining quarter was driven by persistent categories (chart 2).

Housing costs were a key contributor to higher inflation in the September quarter.  This element does look like a capacity issue.  The construction sector remains highly constrained and dwelling approvals have risen by almost 10% since the start of the year (chart 3).

With house prices also on the rise, it is not surprising that dwelling costs are again picking up.  This pressure had been building prior to the September quarter release (chart 4).  Given the large weight of housing in the CPI basket, this is material for the inflation outlook.  If the housing market continues to strengthen, we should expect more price pressure.

Another key area of strength was market services prices.  Our current assessment is that this mainly reflects temporary margin rebuilding, rather than broad capacity constraints.  Demand for many of these discretionary services fell sharply during the cost-of-living squeeze, supressing profits and making it harder to pass on higher input costs.

With demand and general business conditions picking up, these firms look to have taken advantage of that to opportunistically claw back some profit margin.  The areas of inflation strength broadly match the strength we are seeing in our internal consumer spending data (chart 5).

This margin rebuilding process could persist for several months, if demand stays relatively strong.  We expect this, along with higher dwelling costs, to keep inflation a little elevated as we move into 2026.  As such, we have lifted our trimmed mean forecast for Q4 25 to 0.8% (from 0.6%).

This is one key reason why we don’t expect further rate cuts in the near term.  Even if we have not hit full capacity across the economy, annual trimmed mean inflation will simply be too high for the RBA Board to be comfortable cutting rates.

Not out of the woods yet

The inflation spike may not represent a ‘smoking gun’ (i.e. proving that the economy has run out of spare capacity) but that doesn’t mean we are out of the woods.  Over time, the economy cannot grow above its potential rate, without generating inflation pressure.  And three facts appear clear:

  • potential growth in Australia is now lower;
  • we are starting this upswing with less spare capacity (headroom);
  • we are already getting close to our economic speed limit

Harry Ottley recently updated our estimate of Australia’s potential growth rate to 2.1% (here).  Persistently weaker productivity growth has dragged down our growth ‘speed limit’ over time.  This is a common global story, but Australia has not been able to buck the trend, despite impressive improvements in female and older-age participation in the labour force.

In his speech, Deputy Governor Hauser noted that Australia is starting this cyclical upswing with less spare capacity than in past cycles (chart 6).  We agree, and this matters a lot for the inflation and interest rate outlook.

For much of the pre-COVID decade the Australian economy was operating with substantial excess capacity.  GDP growth was relatively tepid, real wages were hardly growing, and the unemployment rate sat between 5-6% (above most current estimates of full employment).  The result was that inflation regularly undershot the RBA target band (chart 7).

The labour market has softened considerably since unemployment hit 3.4% in October 2022, but at 4.3% the jobless rate still sits well below pre-COVID levels.  Total labour utilisation (unemployment and underemployment) also hasn’t weakened as much as the headline rate (chart 8). This helps to explain why many firms still report finding it difficult to find workers.

The strength of public spending during this cycle, notably on health, disabilities and infrastructure, has also left us with a smaller output gap than a normal cycle, despite weakness in private demand.

In many ways this is something to celebrate.  Unlike past cycles, the RBA hasn’t had to ‘break’ the economy and drive-up unemployment to bring inflation back under control.  Equally, running an unemployment rate at closer to 4.5%, rather than 5.5% is a major structural improvement.

However, this lack of spare capacity (or starting headroom), combined with a lower growth ‘speed limit’ does present new challenges.  It means that whenever growth improves, inflation will emerge more quickly.  The RBA will need to remain ‘on alert’ to this risk, meaning interest rates can’t fall as far, and rates will need to stay higher than in past cycles.

Have we already hit our economic speed limit?

So, have we breached this speed limit already?  Is inflation likely to continue picking up over coming months, requiring a monetary policy response?  In our view, the answer is no, but we are getting closer.  Our assessment is that the economy is close to full capacity, but not yet beyond it.

Annual GDP growth in Australia stepped up to 1.8% in Q2 25 and has likely strengthened further since then.  We forecast the economy will be running just above potential (at 2.2%) by March 2026 (chart 9).  Importantly, that is where we expect growth to top out.  In our view, slower household income growth, modestly restrictive monetary policy, and the shift from an easing to a hiking bias on rates will see growth stabilise at around potential.  The RBA November forecasts have growth peaking a little lower at 2.0%.

Survey measures are a useful cross-check on the official GDP data.  The composite PMI (manufacturing and services) has strengthened and sits at around 52.6 in October.  This suggests the economy is steadily expanding.  Capacity utilisation has also been increasing recently, after a steady decline, and is sitting at relatively high levels by historical standards (chart 10).

The labour market is harder to read but appears to be broadly in balance and close to full employment.  Nominal wages growth has been steadily falling, and trend unemployment sits at our current estimate of the NAIRU at 4.4%.  Job vacancy data is mixed, some measures have come off quite sharply — some measures are now back to pre-COVID levels, but others remain a little elevated (chart 11).

Our internal data provides a leading signal on wages and employment.  It suggests that both measures have started to stabilise.  It will be important to watch these series closely for any signs of a strengthening in the labour market that could signal broader capacity constraints.

Trent Saunders and Harry Ottley will shortly update our estimates of the output gap and the NAIRU to shed more light on this question.

Which road are we on?

Our house view is that the economy is currently close to full capacity, but that it will stay at around that level throughout 2026.  Near term inflationary pressures around housing and market services, combined with a general lack of spare capacity in the economy, will prevent any further rate cuts.  At the same time, given we don’t expect growth to rise above potential, we don’t expect inflation to lift further, avoiding the need for rate hikes.  As a result, we are forecasting steady interest rates through 2026.

The main risk to this view is that a) capacity is more constrained than we currently judge and/or b) the economy continues to build up steam and grows above potential in 2026.  Both are possible and this would see the prospect of interest rate hikes come onto the table in 2026.

As always, inflation and the jobs market will be the key indicators to watch moving forward.  The new monthly CPI indicator complicates the picture, given the RBA does not have a track record interpreting this series.  In our view, if the full quarterly CPI outcome for December is above 0.8% and the trend unemployment rate turns around and starts to decline, the RBA will be forced to adopt a much more hawkish tone at their February meeting, and the possibility of rate hikes in 2026 will come back onto the table.

The key downside risks centre around the labour market.  A material lift in the unemployment rate would suggest more capacity in the economy, with scope for inflation to ease more quickly.  There is also a risk that a hawkish RBA could take more heat out of the consumer recovery and the buoyant housing market than we currently expect.  This could see rate cuts come back onto the table later in 2026.

Lifting the speed limit

Finally, Deputy-Governor Hauser made another critical point in his speech around the importance of productivity.  He noted that if Australia could materially lift productivity growth, the economy could grow faster, without sparking inflation.  He argued that we should strive to lift the economy’s speed limit, to avoid being boxed in to a lower growth, higher inflation future.  In other words, rather than driving along a bumpy, windy dirt road, we could instead take the four-lane expressway.

Delivering ambitious and large-scale economic reform has proven difficult in Australia in recent decades.  However, if it becomes apparent to the public over the next few years that low productivity is keeping inflation high and preventing further interest rates cuts, this might finally be the catalyst Governments need to pursue stronger action on reform.

Head to the Newsroom for the latest news and announcements from Commonwealth Bank.

Here are Australia's most trusted and distrusted brands for 2025

Trust is not something a company can buy, borrow or barter. It has to be earned, then guarded. Roy Morgan’s latest national survey charts which brands managed that feat in 2025 and which ones fell further behind.

The 2025 results confirm a familiar leader, shifting fortunes for major banks and a sharp fall from grace for several online retailers whose rise in popularity has been matched only by a rise in distrust.

Banks bounce back into trusted territory

Australia’s biggest banks spent much of the past decade clawing back public confidence. The latest Roy Morgan figures show that effort is finally paying off. Commonwealth Bank jumped two places to land in the top five trusted brands for the first time. Westpac climbed five spots to reach fourteenth.

NAB edged higher to nineteenth. ING returned to the top twenty in twentieth place. Bendigo Bank held steady in fifteenth. The banking industry as a whole moved into net trust for the first time in years, rising ten industry-ranking places in one quarter, an unusually fast shift in sentiment.

Physical retail shines, as online retail Shein's itself

Shoppers continue to give brick and mortar retailers the benefit of the doubt. Bunnings retained its crown as Australia’s most trusted brand for an eighth straight quarter. There's a reason it's one of the only Aussie stores to ever score its own spot in the famed kids show Bluey.

Meanwhile, Aldi held second, and Kmart stayed third to round off the podium.

Big W remained in the top ten, slipping only one place to seventh. JB Hi Fi and Myer again featured among the country’s most trusted names. No wonder, seeing as how physical stores - despite falling sales - are seen as reliable, consistent and transparent.

Online marketplaces tell a different story. Temu’s distrust worsened to make it the fifth most distrusted brand over the year. Amazon fell one place to tenth most distrusted. Shein slid to eleventh. Their reputations are being dragged down by concerns about poor quality goods, a lack of ethics, profit driven behaviour and unreliable service. Roy Morgan noted that the more Australians use these platforms the faster their distrust grows, a trend that has accelerated through 2025. Honestly? Thank God. The fewer folks using them the better, says I.

The top 10s

Who doesn't love a top ten list?

Australia’s most trusted brands in 2025

Bunnings stayed in first place. It has led the national trust rankings for eight consecutive quarters, so its position is unchanged. Aldi held second without movement. Kmart stayed in third, continuing a four quarter run in that position. Apple remained in fourth with no change. Commonwealth Bank rose two places into fifth, its highest result on record. Toyota slipped one position to sixth, pushed out of the top five by CBA’s rise. Big W fell one place to seventh. Coles held eighth without change. Woolworths held ninth. Australia Post slipped one place to tenth.

Australia’s most distrusted brands in 2025

Screenshot

Everyone hates the duopoly, it seems. Woolworths again ranked as the most distrusted brand in Australia. Coles remained in second, with both supermarkets holding their positions for a fourth straight quarter.

Online fast-fashion retailer and international bad guy, Temu, deteriorated one place to become the fifth most distrusted brand on a twelve month view, although it ranked as the single most distrusted brand for the month of September.

Speaking of villains, Tesla slipped one place to seventh.

2025 market-darling Telstra improved one place to eighth. Amazon meanwhile fell one place to tenth.

Outside of the top 10, Shein worsened one place to eleventh. McDonald’s deteriorated two places to sixteenth. Jetstar dropped three places to eighteenth. Shell slipped one place to nineteenth, while BP improved one place to twentieth. News Corp rose two places to twelfth.

Rio Tinto climbed one place to seventeenth.

Trump wants Australian-style superannuation to boost the birth rate: would that even work?

It seems President Trump has been paying closer attention to Australia than some of us might have given him credit for. He told reporters on Wednesday that his Administration is looking at the Australian-style superannuation system to fund retirement as a way of lifting the nation's rapidly declining birth rate.

Implementing superannuation schemes in America would be a right-sight better than whatever hodgepodge they've got over there now (as I'll get into). But using super schemes to increase the birth rate? I'm not sure the numbers stack up here for the Donald.

He said what?

The President made the rather off-the-cuff comments in praise of super at an event where billionaire Michael Dell and his wife announced a $US6.5 billion endowment to benefit American kids under the so-called "Trump Accounts" scheme. It's worth pointing out that the donation by the Dell's to America's youth represents the second largest in American history behind that of Warren Buffett to the Bill and Melinda Gates foundation.

Trump Accounts is just one lever the President has pulled to help expand the birth rate in the US. One idea he previously landed on after just retaking office was giving American women who had eight or more children a literal medal for doing so.

Reporters from the press pool asked what else the Administration would be working on to lift fertility rates, and he talked specifically in favour on Australia's  Superannuation scheme.

"We are looking at programs. There’s a certain Australian plan that people are liking and they’re talking about … not for children, necessarily, but it’s for people, working people," adding "we're looking at it very seriously, it has worked out very well.

"It's a good plan," he concluded.

It's no secret the US retirement system is a mess compared to something like superannuation. So how would it work if Trump wanted to switch it up for a more green and gold-style approach to retirement? And what does money when you're old have to do with having kids?

Could superannuation supercharge the US birth rate?

We've currently got more people alive on earth than ever, right now. By 2026 the global population is estimated to be around 8.3 billion folks getting about. Almost 350 million of those live in the USA. 

But despite the big numbers, it's the little ones that has Trump and his Administration concerned. The US fertility rate is now at around 1.63 children per woman as of 2023, and slid to 1.60 in 2024 according to US health data. That's the lowest it has ever been, and it's below the bar for what's known as the 'replacement' birth rate. 

The replacement birth rate refers to the number of kids needed per woman to literally "replace" the generation that came before them while still growing the population. In most developed countries, that number is at 2.1. It's worth noting, however, that the World Bank puts the replacement rate at 2.3 and the UN puts it at 2.24.

But what does all this have to do with retirement accounts and super?

401(K)s versus superannuation: how does the US differ from Australia?

I'm no economist, but from my spot up here in the cheap seats, the system for funding retirement in the US looks like a right mess. 

Talking about super in an American context means talking about two very different creatures. A 401(k) is essentially a voluntary savings account with tax perks. Australian super is a compulsory, whole-of-workforce retirement architecture. They might both be “retirement accounts” on paper, but they behave very differently in the real world.

In the US, a 401(k) only exists for you if your employer offers one, and if you personally choose to participate. That sounds like you're speaking a foreign language to Australians, some of whom have had super since the 1980s. Contributions to a US 401(k) account come from your pay, and sometimes your employer matches a portion. 

As a result, not everyone has super to fall back on in America. Big companies tend to offer a generous 401(k) and a matching contribution as a perk to attract new talent. But small- to medium-sized businesses often don't match contributions or offer 401(k) accounts at all.

Those who do have a 401(K) are then asked to figure out how they want the funds invested. As opposed to the Australian system where many folks simply let a big bank or funds manager sort it out for them.

That's why Trump's praise for Aussie super is kind of weird. He's a lover of the free-market, hater of so-called 'big government, a worshipper at the altar of Wall Street and campaigned on increasing the take-home pay of his constituents. Implementing an Australian-style super guarantee would see less money in the pay checks of ordinary Americans overall.

But weirdness aside, adding financial stability for your post-retirement years - Trump would argue - likely leads to reduced long-term financial anxiety and increases funds available overall at a household level to start or grow a family.

But is it that simple? Looking at our data, I'm not so sure.

Has Australia's super scheme boosted the birth rate?

Former Treasurer Peter Costello once famously and horrendously said on TV back in the 90's that Australian mothers should have "one for mum, one for dad, and one for the country". This was back when he announced the baby bonus back in 2004 hat was designed to similarly lift the local birth rate. 

I can't say that particular turn of phrase - nor its user - influenced anyone to hop into the baby-making process, but stats back me up here.

The ABS says Australia has been below the 2.1 replacement rate since about 1976, and it continues to precipitously fall, regardless of what the government does to increase mandatory super contributions from employers.

The Howard Liberal government upped the super contribution to 9% in 2003, while the Rudd-Gillard-Rudd government successfully proposed a staged rise of 0.5% per year up to 12% starting from 2015. Tony Abbott's government delayed the scheme, but eventually we ended up in 2025 with a super guarantee of 12%.

In the background of all this argy-bargy over super, however, the local birth rate continued to decline. And decline, and decline.

Source: ABS

When Keating kicked off the mandatory super guarantee in 1992, the total fertility rate was 1.89. But that had slumped to 1.76 by the time Howard and Costello gave super a boost in 2003. Admittedly, the rate then climbed until 2007 (1.99) when the global financial crisis hit home. Rates in 2025 - despite a 12% super guarantee - now sit at 1.48. Yep: we're lower than the US which by its President's own admission, is experiencing something of a birthing crisis.

It's no surprise that just tweaking someone's retirement guarantee doesn't immediately have them looking at schools and shopping for prams. Demographers note that things like housing affordability, cost of living, childcare costs and parental leave all contribute far more to the fertility rate than superannuation guarantees do.

But nobody suggested this is a silver bullet, after all. There are many levers on which government can pull, and this is just one such lever. Reducing long-term financial anxiety can go a long way towards benefiting an economy in the short- to medium-term as well as in the long term.

And whether it helps the birth rate or not, it'd likely see many senior Americans (mostly women, I might add) not having to work until they drop dead on the job, or worse, turfed out onto the streets into poverty.

Have at it, Donald.

Could Pauline Hanson’s One Nation become the new Federal Opposition?

New polling out today from DemosAU shows that Pauline Hanson’s One Nation party could pick up as many as 18 seats if the election were held today. That is as many as the Liberals hold right now in Parliament. Could PHON become the new Opposition? Here is how it works.

Parliament by the numbers

Labor is already dominating the House of Representatives following its recent commanding election win. Albo's party holds 94 seats in the House of Representatives right now. The Liberal–National Coalition, meanwhile, once the natural alternative government for as long as any of us can probably remember, has shrunk to 43 seats spread across three parties. The Liberals hold 18 seats, the Queensland LNP holds 16 and the Nationals hold 9. Minor parties have just three seats between them, while ten independents sit on the crossbench.

Against that backdrop, the new DemosAU multilevel regression projection lands like a thunderclap. It suggests Labor could climb toward the 100-seat mark if an election were held today. The Coalition would fall to roughly half its current size. And One Nation, which holds no lower-house seats at present, could surge into double digits. The model’s upper range has them reaching 18 seats, which is the same number the Liberal Party currently brings to the chamber.

 

This polling begs the question: could Pauline Hanson become the new opposition leader if the election were to be held today?

Could PHON really become the new Opposition?

While Labor or Liberal-National Coalition have held onto both government and opposition for decades, it doesn't mean it has to stay that way. The Opposition is not defined by tradition or history, it is defined by simple maths. The largest non-government grouping in the House is recognised by the Speaker as the Opposition. That grouping can be a single party or a formal coalition.

The key blocker to a Hanson-led Opposition? The fragile Coalition agreement between Libs and Nats.

Under today’s DemosAU projection, One Nation does not come close to overtaking the Coalition bloc as it currently operates. Even if PHON were to win at the upper end of the model’s range, they would match the Liberal Party, not the combined Coalition. As long as the Coalition agreement holds, the three conservative parties act as one parliamentary unit, and that keeps them the Opposition regardless of how many seats One Nation manages to collect.

Still, the projection highlights two important currents. First, One Nation’s vote is concentrated in Queensland and parts of regional Australia, which is why a modest national vote share can translate into a cluster of winnable seats. That same geographic concentration is what makes the Greens competitive in inner-city electorates. Second, if the Coalition parties ever broke their agreement, each would be judged on its seat count alone. A Liberal Party reduced to the high teens would suddenly be competing with One Nation to be the largest non-government party.

The path for PHON to become the Opposition therefore exists, but only through a political rupture on the right combined with a sustained rise in their regional seat strength. Under normal conditions, the Coalition remains the Opposition by sheer weight of numbers.

Pollies giving 'jobs-for-mates' lets down the Australian people, says official inquiry report

An independent inquiry has strongly condemned the politicisation of appointments to government boards, declaring present processes have “let down the Australian people” and are not fit for purpose.

In her report former public service commissioner Lynelle Briggs has recommended a very detailed appointment process, with checks and balances, to restore integrity, which would put considerable limits on ministerial discretion.

But the government has rejected much of the constraint that Briggs’ plan would impose on ministers. Instead, Minister for the Public Service Katy Gallagher announced on Tuesday an “appointment framework” that is much looser and allows wider ministerial discretion than Briggs urges.

At a Senate estimates hearing on Tuesday, Gallagher faced tough questioning from the opposition and crossbenchers over the government’s handling of, and response to, the report.

The Albanese government commissioned the Briggs report and received it in August 2023. It resisted pressure from the Senate for its release, saying it was still working on it.

One key recommendation the government has rejected is that politicians and their staffers should not be appointed to government boards within six months of leaving government positions, or 18 months in ministers’ portfolio areas.

Gallagher said the government didn’t believe people should be excluded if they had the necessary skill set.

It will also not take up the recommendation that for six months before the last possible election date, no ministerial board appointments should be made that have not been progressed through the standard appointment process.

Briggs’ inquiry focused on some 200 governing and decision-making boards. Given it was appointed early in Labor’s term, much of the attention looked backward at the Coalition government.

“The extent of what are perceived as political appointments in recent years has contributed to a climate where public trust in government has been undermined,” the report says.

“Too often the practice in recent years has been to appoint friends of the Government to boards, either as a reward for past loyalty or to ensure alignment with government priorities and all too often these appointments have looked like forms of patronage and nepotism that should have no place in the modern Australian society,” Briggs says.

“I found that the current board appointment arrangements are not fit for purpose. They have let down the Australian people, undermined the integrity and effectiveness of the public sector and exposed Ministers to unnecessary risk,” she says.

“They do not provide Ministers with a disciplined and structured appointments process that ensures a broad, relevant, and diverse skill set for their boards. They do not provide Ministers with the support that they need to find the best candidates and make appointment decisions. They do not always provide the best people for the job.

"When the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand found themselves in similar circumstances, they acted to introduce or restore independence to appointment processes.”

Briggs’ detailed model for board appointments would advertise all board positions, and include a range of candidate search and talent management arrangements to improve board diversity and quality.

“The model still provides for Ministers to make direct appointments but puts transparent and clear process around those decisions.”

The report urges its recommended processes be enshrined in a new act of parliament but the government has not accepted this.

Gallagher said in estimates that the government had responded to 19 of the 30 recommendations with the framework, a further three were covered by guidance, three were subject to further consideration and five recommendations were not covered by the framework.

Among the principles set out in the government’s framework is that ministers “have flexibility to implement selection processes suitable for sourcing the best candidates for appointments within their portfolio(s)”.

Independent senator David Pocock said, “It is very disappointing that the Albanese Government has refused to accept the full suite of recommendations from the Briggs Review designed to stop the rampant jobs for mates culture that exists in federal politics.

"I’ve worked hard with all non-government senators to secure the release of the Briggs review. Now it’s clear why the Albanese government was hiding it for two years.”The Conversation

Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Winners and losers in the Federal government's new AI strategy

This week, the Albanese Labor government released the long-awaited National AI Plan, “a whole-of-government framework that ensures technology works for people, not the other way around”.

With this plan, the government promises an inclusive artificial intelligence (AI) economy that protects workers, fills service gaps, and supports local AI development.

In a major reversal, it also confirms Australia won’t implement mandatory guardrails for high-risk AI. Instead, it argues our existing legal regime is sufficient, and any minor changes for specific AI harms or risk can be managed with help from a new A$30 million AI Safety Institute within the Department of Industry.

Avoiding big changes to Australia’s legal system makes sense in light of the plan’s primary goal – making Australia an attractive location for international data centre investment.

The initial caution is gone

After the public release of ChatGPT in November 2022 ushered in a generative AI boom, initial responses focused on existential risks posed by AI.

Leading AI figures even called for a pause on all AI research. Governments outlined plans to regulate.

But as investment in AI has grown, governments around the world have now shifted from caution to an AI race: embracing the opportunities while managing risks.

In 2023, the European Union created the world’s leading AI plan promoting the uptake of human-centric and trustworthy artificial intelligence. The United States launched its own, more bullish action plan in July 2025.

The new Australian plan prioritises creating a local AI software industry, spreading the benefit of AI “productivity gains” to workers and public service users, capturing some of the relentless global investment in AI data centres, and promoting Australia’s regional leadership by becoming an infrastructure and computing hub in the Indo-Pacific.

Those goals are outlined in the plan’s three pillars: capturing the opportunities, spreading the benefits, and keeping us safe.

What opportunities are we capturing?

The jury is still out on whether AI will actually boost productivity for all organisations and businesses that adopt it.

Regardless, global investment in AI infrastructure has been immense, with some predictions on global data centre investments reaching A$8 trillion by 2030 (so long as the bubble doesn’t burst before then).

Through the new AI plan, Australia wants to get in on the boom and become a location for US and global tech industry capital investment.

In the AI plan, the selling point for increased Australian data centre investment is the boost this would provide for our renewable energy transition. States are already competing for that investment. New South Wales has streamlined data centre approval processes, and Victoria is creating incentives to “ruthlessly” chase data centre investment in greenfield sites.

Under the new federal environmental law reforms passed last week, new data centre approvals may be fast-tracked if they are co-located with new renewable power, meaning less time to consider biodiversity and other environmental impacts.

But data centres are also controversial. Concerns about the energy and water demands of large data centres in Australia are already growing.

The water use impacts of data centres are significant – and the plan is remarkably silent on this apart from promising “efficient liquid cooling”. So far, experience from Germany and the US shows data centres stretching energy grids beyond their limit.

It’s true data centre companies are likely to invest in renewable energy, but at the same time growth in data centre demands is currently justifying the continuation of fossil fuel use.

There’s some requirement for Australian agencies to consider the environmental sustainability of data centres hosting government services. But a robust plan for environmental assessment and reporting across public and private sectors is lacking.

Who will really benefit from AI?

The plan promises the economic and efficiency benefits of AI will be for everyone – workers, small and medium businesses, and those receiving government services.

Recent scandals suggest Australian businesses are keen to use AI to reduce labour costs without necessarily maintaining service quality. This has created anxiety around the impact of AI on labour markets and work conditions.

Australia’s AI plan tackles this through promoting worker development, training and re-skilling, rather than protecting existing conditions.

The Australian union movement will need to be active to make the “AI-ready workers” narrative a reality, and to protect workers from AI being used to reduce labour costs, increase surveillance, and speed up work.

The plan also mentions improving public service efficiency. Whether or not those efficiency gains are possible is hard to say. However, the plan does recognise we’ll need comprehensive investment to unlock the value of private data holdings and public public data holdings useful for AI.

Will we be safe enough?

With the release of the plan, the government has officially abandoned last year’s proposals for mandatory guardrails for high-risk AI systems. It claims Australia’s existing legal frameworks are already strong, and can be updated “case by case”.

As we’ve pointed out previously, this is out of step with public opinion. More than 75% of Australians want AI regulation.

It’s also out of step with other countries. The European Union already prohibits the most risky AI systems, and has updated product safety and platform regulations. It’s also currently refining a framework for regulating high-risk AI systems. Canadian federal government systems are regulated by a tiered risk management system. South Korea, Japan, Brazil and China all have rules that govern AI-specific risks.

Australia’s claim to have a strong, adequate and stable legal framework would be much more credible if the document included a plan for, or clarity about our significant law reform backlog. This backlog includes privacy rights, consumer protection, automated decision-making in government post-Robodebt, as well as copyright and digital duty of care.

Ultimately the National AI Plan says some good things about sustainability, sharing the benefits, and keeping Australians safe even as the government makes a pitch for data centre investment and becoming an AI hub for the region.

Compared with those of some other nations, the plan is short on specificity. The test will lie in whether the government gives substance to its goals and promises, instead of just chasing the short-term AI investment dollar.The Conversation

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Jake Goldenfein, The University of Melbourne; Christine Parker, The University of Melbourne, and Kimberlee Weatherall, University of Sydney

Why Australia should stop being America's 'best mate'

Clinton Fernandes has established himself as one of the most original and insightful analysts of Australian security policy. An early career with the Australian Army Intelligence Corps no doubt gave him an inside view of the ideas that influence security policy in this country.

I’m not surprised he changed careers. To judge by this outstanding book, there is little regard for intelligence, much less independence of thought, among the people who shape “Australia’s” strategic outlook.

The scare quotes are merited because, as Fernandes observes, “Australia’s policy planners are motivated by […] a single standard – does something protect or advance US power and Australia’s relevance to it?”

One of the most noteworthy features of Fernades’ analysis in Turbulence: Australian Foreign Policy in the Trump Era and his previous work, especially Sub-Imperial Power: Australia in the International Arena (2022), is his ability to account for policy outcomes by placing them in their distinctive historical and geographic contexts.

For those baffled by the decision to buy nuclear-powered submarines from the United States and possibly Britain as part of the AUKUS agreement, Turbulence is essential reading. A growing number of commentators, including former prime ministers and senior military figures, have questioned the wisdom of what Paul Keating called the “worst deal in all history”. Fernandes explains why AUKUS is an all-too-predictable continuation of past follies.

Supporters of AUKUS have suggested that buying and possibly building submarines is a nation-building project on a par with the Snowy Mountains scheme. But Fernandes makes it clear that, “despite ideologically strident claims by Australia’s leaders”, AUKUS is “a contribution of people, territory, materials, money, diplomacy and ideology to the war-fighting capabilities of the United States”.

The art of ingratiation

Making ourselves useful to our “great and powerful friend” is the default setting for strategic and by extension foreign policy in Australia. It has been for 80 years. As far as policymaking elites are concerned, it is literally unthinkable that we should do anything else.

This takes some explaining at any time, but when Donald Trump is president and many think the US is lurching headlong into full-blown authoritarianism, it looks indefensible and at odds with even the most expansive definition of the “national interest”.

What is more remarkable, perhaps, is that we are no longer alone in our enthusiasm to ingratiate ourselves with the Americans. In addition to an analysis of the AUKUS project, Fernandes includes chapters on the Trump administration’s relations with Europe, the Middle East and China. All of them reflect his breadth of knowledge of the contemporary strategic scene and the potentially catastrophic impact Trump is having on the international order America did so much to create.

The US is the principal beneficiary of that order. That Trump and his hand-picked team of flunkies question this reflects their historical ignorance and desire for enrichment.

Fernandes argues that the Trump administration’s disdain for Europe has culminated in policies designed to make Europe “fit in with US industrial policy, curtail their economic relations with China and help preserve US technological dominance”. As he wryly observes, “this system of paying tributes and protection costs will be familiar to students of past imperial arrangements – and to people who watch films about organised crime and its protection rackets”.

Indeed. The wonder is that Australian policymakers are so in thrall to the US that they appear not to care.

They are hardly unique in this regard, of course. Some countries have no inhibitions – or shame – about their willingness to ingratiate themselves, as Qatar’s gift of a Boeing 747 to Trump himself demonstrates. This was in addition to the US$45 billion investment in American corporations promised in 2019 and another US$10 billion to expand the existing American air base in Qatar.

The US is developing a system of tributary states, but without the sense of common culture and acceptance that made the earlier Chinese version rather more palatable and stabilising.

More importantly, Australia’s historical willingness to do whatever the US wants has seen us take part in pointless wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Fernandes’ book is full of sobering illustrations of our foreign policy hypocrisy. Australia rightly criticises China’s actions in Tibet and Xinjiang, for example, but has been slow to condemn Israel’s actions in Gaza, and has said nothing about the US’s extrajudicial killings in Venezuela.

“Human rights will be ignored or highlighted as needed,” Fernandes concludes – as needed to stay onside with the US, that is. He argues that Australia helps to legitimate America’s imperial project and its goal of controlling the Middle East “through a sub-imperial power (Israel) and protectorates (oil-rich Arab monarchies)”.

Threats: real and notional

For many Australians and for the Trump administration, China remains the principal object of concern. Fernandes uses the debate over “freedom of navigation” to illustrate how misguided and limited discussion of the “China threat” actually is.

As the world’s largest trading nation, China is even more reliant on safe passage for its exports than Australia. As Fernades points out, “the last thing China wants is a war in the western Pacific Ocean, which would disrupt nearly all its seaborn supplies”.

In practice, complaints about freedom of navigation are driven by the desire to spy on China’s strategic assets without being harassed:

The silence over what ‘freedom of navigation’ really involves protects the government from democratic accountability, and from debate as to how Australia’s intelligence agencies and military should be used. These are questions of politics, not military strategy.

Even China’s much criticised military build-up can be understood more easily in a wider context that includes a recognition of America’s perennial willingness to use coercive power, including nuclear weapons, to achieve its ends. Seen in this light the acquisition of nuclear weapons by China seems “rational”, at least when judged by the calculus of great-power grand strategy and the logic of deterrence.

 

Fernandes is enough of an ex-military man and a strategic realist to take seriously arguments about the need for an independent defence capacity. Indeed, he stresses that “submarines are an essential defence capability for a maritime nation like Australia”.

In this regard, Fernandes is at one with other prominent commentators, such as Albert Palazzo and Hugh White, both former insiders turned critics. They are all more concerned about the possibility of making an inappropriate choice of submarine than whether the submarines are needed or not.

Anyone doubting that Australian policymakers are making the wrong choice for the wrong reasons, should read Fernandes’ detailed argument in favour of “air-independent propulsion” submarines, which don’t encourage nuclear proliferation and have the added benefit of being comparatively cheap.

It really isn’t that hard or expensive to defend an island continent a long way from global trouble spots. New Zealand manages with the bare minimum of expense and equipment, no awkward alliance obligations, and yet remains one of the safest places in the world.

Redefining realism

Credible critiques from the likes of Fernandes are important contributions to a debate that may be gaining traction thanks to the efforts of academics and civil society organisations.

For those of us who think that environmental breakdown presents a more immediate and “realistic” threat to Australia’s security than the disruption of sea lanes, much less invasion, the prioritisation of traditional sources of insecurity looks misplaced.

It is striking that even the most informed analyses of security feel obliged to take on the “realists” on their own turf. The debate still revolves around the most cost-effective ways of threatening to kill people in countries we don’t know much about, a potential defence minister Richard Marles euphemistically describes as “impactful projection”.

Rather than fretting about a possible Chinese invasion, we ought to be thinking about ways we can cooperate with a country that is at least trying to address climate change. The US, by contrast, is not only becoming equally authoritarian. It has become unreliable and disruptive. And it is actively working to undermine existing efforts to address what Trump describes as a climate “con job”.

Such attitudes directly threaten the security of the entire planet. They give comfort to those who would prefer not to act and carry on with self-destructive business as usual.

In Australia, the major political parties are not that far apart on the environment. Projects like the North West Shelf gas development, which will significantly add to Australia’s – and the world’s – greenhouse gas emissions are waved through in the “national interest”.

As the environment disintegrates before our eyes, we really do need to rethink our priorities, especially for the sake of coming generations. If we don’t, the young may inherit more turbulence than they know what to do with.The Conversation

Mark Beeson, Adjunct professor, Australia-China Relations Institute, University of Technology Sydney

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

2026 market outlook: is the worst behind us or still to come?

It's already December, so it's time to start thinking up those new-year resolutions. But what's in store for the market in 2026? Is the worst of the recent 'bubble'-driven volatility behind us? We asked legendary stock picker Jun Bei Liu from TenCap to weigh in.

Throughout December, we'll bring you expert takes on potential 2026 market trends and outlooks. Each instalment will explore the forces shaping the year ahead, from interest rates and global growth to sector trends, company earnings and risks to watch. Our aim is to give readers a grounded view of what 2026 may hold and the ideas worth considering as a new market cycle takes shape. Stay tuned for more.

Speaking on Switzer Investing TV this week, Jun Bei Liu thinks the market may finally be stabilising after a bruising stretch. adding that we may be moving past the worst of the volatility and into a more constructive phase for 2026.

She frames the recent sell-off as a cocktail of forced selling, fear and positioning rather than a sign that the economic backdrop has collapsed. A key part of that story, she says, was the “deleveraging effect” that flowed out of the crypto and high-beta end of the market and washed through growth stocks more broadly.

In her words, the selling pressure has now started to clear:

“Some selling has eased and last week was great. Now we’re seeing a bit of stabilisation… you are definitely seeing a lot more appetite, interest into a lot of those names that’s been underperforming.” 

For Liu, the real turning point is not just sentiment, it is the shift in expectations around US monetary policy. The Federal Reserve’s language has been enough to nudge markets towards an easier setting for financial conditions into 2025 and 2026, even before any official move.

“The Federal Reserve… set the tone for liquidity. They are talking to whether it’s one rate cut, but they’ve got many to come next year. That tone is very important. Financial conditions will continue to loosen.” 

That, she argues, is the key backdrop for any serious 2026 outlook. Looser conditions globally make it easier for risk assets to stabilise, especially in the parts of the market that were hit hardest in the latest correction.

Her starting point is simple. The recent period has been painful, but it looks more like a reset within a longer bull market than the start of something darker. The opportunity, she suggests, lies in recognising that turn before everyone feels comfortable again.

Australia is holding up better than investors think

While global narratives still dominate local sentiment, Jun Bei Liu argues that Australia’s economy is in much better shape than many investors give it credit for. The loudest voices are still focused on the absence of RBA rate cuts and the occasional chatter about further hikes, but Liu thinks this fixation is masking the facts on the ground.

Australia, she says, is not weak, it is simply different. Unlike the US, where looser policy is now expected, the RBA has held steady because the local economy has been more resilient than the commentary suggests.

Her case rests on what she sees in the data:

“Our GDP growth will do pretty well. Our consumers are doing pretty well… although very value conscious. Corporate activity is pretty strong, corporate balance sheets are pretty strong. There’s big dividend coming back.” 

Put simply, we aren’t seeing the kind of demand collapse or earnings deterioration that would justify deep cuts. And that matters for the market narrative.

Investors may be waiting for a “rate-cut rally”, but Liu’s view is that they’re missing the fact that a stronger-than-expected economy is the actual driver of sustainable earnings growth.

She puts it bluntly:

“No one buys a company because of a rate cut… you buy it because the company is great.” 

The irony, she says, is that investors are treating the lack of cuts as a negative when in reality it reflects a market where households, corporates and sectors like housing and financials are still holding together.

This sets Australia up for a slower, steadier climb rather than the whip-saw moves driven by US rate expectations, and she sees that as an advantage rather than a lag.

The payoff, in her view, is an environment where earnings upgrades begin to outnumber downgrades, even without the adrenaline rush of monetary easing.

The long-awaited rotation into small caps?

One of Jun Bei Liu’s strongest calls is that 2026 will finally bring a broader, healthier rally rather than the narrow, mega-cap-driven surge we’ve seen over the past few years. She argues the conditions are lining up for smaller companies to outperform, driven by easing financial conditions and the simple fact that many of them are now undeniably cheap.

She notes that we’ve already seen flashes of this shift.

“We’ve seen a blip of it a few months ago when people moved from larger to smaller… with rate cuts, the smaller companies are benefiting more from the rate cycle.” 

The logic is straightforward. When interest rates fall or even stabilise, small caps – which are more sensitive to financing costs and investor confidence – tend to recover faster. Liquidity helps them more than it helps trillion-dollar giants.

In Australia, that dynamic is even clearer, she says.

“They also get improvement in investor confidence and they’re a lot cheaper normally. These companies generally do better.” 

Liu thinks 2026 will be the year where the rally broadens meaningfully. Not because the big global tech names collapse, but because other parts of the market finally start to pull their weight.

She sums it up this way:

“Next year is going to be that broadening out of the rally, not just a narrow couple of companies that lead the market.” 

This rotation theme anchors much of her 2026 outlook. In her view, the era of chasing only the most obvious winners is ending, and a more balanced market – one where smaller, cyclically exposed and overlooked businesses contribute again – is the natural next step in the cycle.

How to get started with bonds from a leading Aussie expert

 

In this week’s episode, Peter Switzer talks with TenCap's Jun Bei Liu about whether the market has finally stabilised, what 2026 could look like for equities, and the sectors and stocks now offering value.

Peter also interviews Philip Brown from FIIG in a practical walk through the world of bonds, how to think about yields and prices, and how investors can get started without needing wholesale-level capital.

 

Subscribe so you don’t miss future episodes.

Super funds are failing more retirees than ever

Too many superannuation funds are still failing to provide sufficient support to retirees, three years after being urged to lift standards, Australia’s top regulators have warned.

This failure to prepare comes despite the massive demographic wave of Australians already in or about to enter retirement.

A new report from the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) reveals the industry’s response has been slow, uneven and, in the regulators’ words, merely “incremental”.

The report shows a widening gap between the best and worst funds. For a growing number of Australians, this failure isn’t a future problem – it’s affecting their lives right now.

The retirement wave is here

The scale of the shift is breathtaking. More than 1.6 million Australians are already drawing a pension from their super, with another 2.5 million set to retire in the next decade.

With more than A$4.3 trillion in members’ savings invested across the super system, the 1.6 million retired members account for about $575 billion in assets.

Another statistic from the report is particularly staggering: one in five super funds already has half of its members in, or approaching, retirement.

Yet the review found many trustees are still designing services for people accumulating savings during their working lives, not those spending savings in retirement.

In October, ASIC raised concerns about “glaring” gaps in communications, saying funds were sending generic messages aimed at workers, with little tailored help for retirees.

Support for vulnerable groups, including First Nations members and those with low financial literacy, was largely absent.

The challenge is spending, not saving

For decades, the super system’s mantra was simple: save, save, save. The more complex challenge is helping people spend those savings confidently.

Without clear guidance, many retirees are understandably cautious. They withdraw too little, living more frugally than they need to.

Data shows fewer than half of pensioners draw down on their retirement savings, and more than 40% are net savers — turning Australia’s compulsory superannuation system into a massive inheritance scheme. Others spend too aggressively and face poverty later in life.

The regulators are clear: helping retirees spend appropriately is central to the purpose of the “retirement income covenant” introduced in 2022. The new laws aimed to provide an easier transition to retirement and to increase the range of retirement products.

But the latest review found one in five funds provide no guidance on drawdown strategies beyond the legal minimum, leaving members to make high-stakes decisions alone.

A lottery for retirees

The report highlights a dangerous divide. A small group of leading funds are making progress:

But many others are lagging far behind, offering little more than basic calculators and generic information. The result is an inconsistency across the system, where a member’s experience depends entirely on which fund they belong to – the very inequity the covenant was designed to prevent.

Measuring busywork, not wellbeing

While almost every fund claims to have improved its understanding of members, few can demonstrate whether this has actually led to better outcomes for retirees.

The regulators said many funds still rely on “activity-based” metrics, such as website visits or webinar attendance. They are not measuring what truly matters: whether retirees have adequate and sustainable income, and whether they feel financially secure.

This distinction is critical. ASIC’s Moneysmart research shows only one-third of Australians approaching retirement feel confident they will be financially comfortable. In a compulsory super system, that widespread uncertainty is concerning.

What needs to happen now

The regulators have made it clear that funds must move faster. The covenant was never intended to be a compliance box-ticking exercise, but a fundamental shift towards improving members’ lives in retirement.

This requires a multi-layered transformation. First, funds must pivot from simply collecting data to actively using it to identify where members struggle and what support they genuinely need, moving beyond generic reports to personalised insights.

Second, communication must evolve into a lifelong conversation. Guidance can’t stop at the retirement date; it must be practical, tailored, and continue as members age. As ASIC has urged, this means developing relevant communications for people in their 70s and 80s, not just those on the cusp of retiring.

Ultimately, funds must shift their focus from measuring activity to measuring wellbeing. The true test of a fund’s strategy isn’t webinar attendance, but whether its members feel confident and have a sustainable income.

This outcomes-based approach must also be inclusive, ensuring support is accessible and effective for all members, including First Nations communities and other vulnerable groups who have been largely overlooked.

A system at a crossroads

Australia’s superannuation system is at a pivotal moment. It must transition from a wealth-accumulation machine to the nation’s retirement income provider.

Millions of Australians are now relying on their super fund to guide them through the most financially complex stage of their lives. The latest findings show that, three years after being put on notice, too many funds are not yet meeting that responsibility.

The message for the super industry is simple: supporting retirees is no longer a future priority. As the regulators have made clear, it is the immediate priority, and the time for incremental improvement is over.The Conversation

Natalie Peng, Lecturer in Accounting, The University of Queensland

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

In their own words: what the kids think of the Government's upcoming social media ban

From next Wednesday, thousands of young Australians under 16 will lose access to their accounts across ten social media platforms, as the teen social media ban takes effect.

What do young people think about it? Our team of 14 leading researchers from around the country interviewed 86 young people from around Australia, aged between 12 and 15, to find out.

Young people’s voices matter

The social media ban, which was legislated 12 months ago, has attracted considerable media coverage and controversy.

But largely missing from these conversations has been the voices of young people themselves.

This is a problem, because research shows that including young people’s voices is best practice for developing policy that upholds their rights, and allows them to flourish in a digital world.

There’s also evidence that when it comes to public policy concerning young people and their use of technology, discussion often slips into a familiar pattern of moral panic. This view frames young people as vulnerable and in need of protection, which can lead to sweeping “fixes” without strong evidence of effectiveness.

‘My parents don’t really understand’

Our new research, published today, centres the voices of young people.

We asked 86 12–15-year-olds from around Australia what they think about the social media ban and the kinds of discussions they’ve had about it. We also asked them how they use social media, what they like and don’t like about it, and what they think can be done to make it better for them.

Some young people we spoke to didn’t use social media, some used it every now and then, and others were highly active users. But they felt conversations about the ban treated them all the same and failed to acknowledge the diverse ways they use social media.

Many also said they felt adults misunderstand their experiences. As one 13-year-old boy told us:

I think my parents don’t really understand, like they only understand the bad part not the good side to it.

Young people acknowledge that others may have different experiences to them, but they feel adults focus too much on risks, and not enough on the ways social media can be useful.

Many told us they use social media to learn, stay informed, and develop skills. As one 15-year-old girl said, it also helps with hobbies.

Even just how to like do something or like how to make something, I’ll turn to social media for it.

Social media also helps young people find communities and make connections. It is where they find their people.

For some, it offers the representation and understanding they don’t get offline. It is a space to explore their identity, feel affirmed, and experience a sense of belonging they cannot always access in their everyday lives.

One 12-year-old girl told us:

The ability to find new interests and find community with people. This is quite important to me. I don’t have that many queer or neurodivergent friends – some of my favourite creators are queer.

Their social media lives are complex and they feel like the ban is an overly simplistic response to the issues and challenges they face when using social media. As one 12-year-old boy put it:

Banning [social media] fully just straight up makes it a lot harder than finding a solution to the problem […] it’s like taking the easy solution.

So what do they think can be done to make social media a better place for them?

Nuanced restrictions and better education

Young people are not naive about risks. But most don’t think a one-size-fits-all age restriction is the solution. A 14-year-old boy captured the views of many who would rather see platforms crack down on inappropriate and low-quality content:

I think instead of doing like a kids’ version and adult version, there should just be a crackdown on the content, like tighter restrictions and stronger enforcement towards the restrictions.

They also want to see more nuanced restrictions that respond to their different ages, and believe platforms should be doing more to make social media better for young people. As one 13-year-old boy said:

Make the platforms safer because they’re like the person who can have the biggest impact.

Young people also want to see more – and crucially, better – education about using social media that takes a more holistic approach and considers the positives that using social media can have for young people. One 15-year-old boy said:

I’d rather [the government] just like implement more media literacy programs instead of just banning [social media] altogether, because it just makes things a lot more complicated in the long run.

As the teen social media ban edges closer and platforms start to implement the legislation, there are practical things children and teens can do to prepare for these changes.The Conversation

Kim Osman, Senior Research Associate, Digital Media Research Centre, Queensland University of Technology; Lynrose Jane Genon, PhD Candidate, Digital Media Research Centre, Queensland University of Technology, and Michael Dezuanni, Professor, Digital Media Research Centre, Queensland University of Technology

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Kim Osman, Queensland University of Technology; Lynrose Jane Genon, Queensland University of Technology, and Michael Dezuanni, Queensland University of Technology

New rules to restrict how much owners and investors can borrow for a home: here's how it all breaks down

For the first time ever, the Australian banking regulator has announced it will impose new debt-to-income limits on housing loans made by banks.

Such limits are a common tool used by regulators in other nations – including the United Kingdom, Ireland, New Zealand and Canada – to cool housing market lending. The aim is to prevent meltdowns like we saw in the global financial crisis in 2008.

Here’s what’s changing – and what it could mean for prospective home buyers and the housing market as a whole.

What’s been announced

When you apply to take out a loan at a bank, one of their key considerations is how much income you earn each year, compared to the size of the loan.

Having a high debt-to-income ratio – earning relatively less compared to the amount borrowed – is considered riskier.

Until now, there there have been no debt-to-income limits on banks, though other controls such as the serviceability buffer, help curb high-risk lending.

From February 1 2026, the Australian Prudential and Regulatory Authority (APRA) will make banks and other lenders limit the share of new home loans with a high debt-to-income ratio – above or equal to six times before-tax income – to 20% of their new mortgage lending.

For a prospective borrower on the average taxable income of about A$75,000, this ratio would theoretically allow for a loan of up to $450,000.

The limit will apply separately to owner-occupier and investment home loans, meaning those loans won’t be grouped together as a single pool to calculate the 20% limit for each bank. The limits exclude bridging loans for owner-occupiers and loans for the construction of new homes.

Figures cited by APRA show Australia’s new ratio is roughly on par with a similar limit in New Zealand (six to seven times income) but notably higher than that of similar policies in Ireland (3.5 to four times income) and Canada (4.5 times income).

How will it work?

Banks will need to monitor the new home loans they issue to ensure no more than 20% of loans have a high debt-to-income ratio. This will be measured quarterly.

While the debt-to-income limit is new, APRA has intervened previously with other limits. For example, in 2017, it imposed limits on the percentage of new interest-only mortgages banks could write (though these limits were lifted at the beginning of 2019).

What does this mean for getting a loan?

It’s important to note the rules won’t stop banks issuing loans with a debt-to-income ratio above six. It will just restrict the amount of these they can issue.

But the new regulations raise a fair question – if you’re applying for a “high-risk” home loan, will getting one now depend on how many other high risks home loans your bank has handed out?

Well, sort of. The limits will only affect borrowers with a high debt-to-income ratio if the bank they are applying to is near or has hit their limit in a given quarter.

APRA expects some banks to hit such limits within the near future without intervention.

This would make such banks more selective in choosing which loans to approve. It’s possible some could even increase their mortgage rates to deter such loans.

There will be no effect on low debt-to-income borrowers’ ability to obtain a mortgage. Keep in mind existing borrowers are unaffected unless they choose to refinance.

What other effects could there be?

There was no significant reaction to the announcement in the price of Australian bank stocks, suggesting market pundits don’t see the limits hitting bank profitability.

However, studies in other countries, such as the United States and the Netherlands, show debt-to-income and other such limits are effective at curbing risky loans and reducing household stress.

But it can have some unintended side effects. In one Norwegian study, modelling showed debt-to-income limits reduce household debt and housing prices, but also prevent those on low incomes from moving as they are unable to borrow.

This lack of mobility then creates an inequality in the access of better opportunities.

A related study, examining the housing market in Israel, found such limits force some borrowers to buy in cheaper areas with higher commuting costs which are more socio-disadvantaged.

APRA’s balancing act

APRA has used these limits as a new tool to stop risky loans being made. While the current limits won’t affect lending in a big way, the regulator is signalling to borrowers and lenders that they are concerned about risky borrowing and may continue to take action.

As shown elsewhere, more restrictive actions can have the desired effect of reducing risky loans, and therefore curbing housing market crashes.

But such limits can also worsen inequalities, particularly for those already financially constrained. And they could have indirect impacts on prospective first-home buyers looking to take advantage of Labor’s expanded 5% deposit scheme – which by design, allows people to take out larger loans than they otherwise would have been able.The Conversation

Adrian Lee, Associate Professor in Property and Real Estate, Deakin University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.