The Australian government is poised to introduce a new domestic gas reservation policy on the east coast. The plan is meant to tackle growing concerns around spiking gas prices and domestic supply. Large gas producers in Queensland export the vast majority of their gas to overseas buyers and long-reliable wells in Bass Strait are running empty.

While details are still forthcoming, the broad brushstrokes are clear. Gas reservation policies work because, in this instance, they require east coast liquefied natural gas (LNG) producers to reserve specific volumes for domestic use rather than exporting them.

It’s not unexpected. The government flagged the need for major reform following a sector-wide review of the gas market. Domestic gas prices have tripled in a decade as producers focus on export markets. Price rises have hit big users hard and driven up power prices, as gas is now the most expensive way to produce electricity.

High gas prices have pushed the government to bail out gas-reliant smelters and steelworks. Price shocks have forced industries and households to look for cheaper electric options.

The move comes after Australia’s energy market operator warned the east coast will soon face a gas shortfall.

If designed appropriately, the policy has a real chance of forcing exporters to boost domestic supply. This could cut the link between domestic gas prices and much higher global LNG prices. Something has to be done – gas supply stress is real and worsening. It won’t address all market and infrastructure issues facing the east coast gas market, such as a shortage of pipeline capacity linking Queensland and the southern states.

What would a gas reservation policy look like?

After an energy crisis in the 1980s, Western Australia introduced its own gas reservation policy which required producers to reserve 15% of gas for domestic use.

But no such scheme has applied on the east coast. Instead, there’s been a mix of regulatory reforms, voluntary industry deals and state-level proposals. Former Liberal leader Peter Dutton took a plan to reserve gas to this year’s election, though it lacked detail on the mechanics, infrastructure constraints and who would bear the costs.

What the Albanese government is proposing would apply only to the east coast, which has a separate gas network, and only to gas that hasn’t already been committed under long-term export contracts.

The proposed scheme would likely build on existing regulatory frameworks such as the Australian Domestic Gas Security Mechanism and Mandatory Gas Code, but would apply more directly to east-coast exporters which are largely located in Queensland.

The plan is to link the new scheme to a broader regulatory overhaul as part of the government’s Future Gas Strategy launched last year. The strategy is meant to ensure gas remains affordable and to manage supply and demand as Australia shifts to clean energy.

Three pillars

While full details are yet to be announced, we know there will be three main elements: a mandatory reservation volume, a gas security incentive, and competitive domestic pricing.

The mandatory reservation will require gas producers to reserve a portion of their supply for the domestic market, likely to be around 50–100 petajoules in its first year of operation. That would represent roughly 10–20% of the 520PJ burned in gas power stations as of 2021–22.

Efforts by previous governments have been voluntary. This will be mandatory, forcing producers to reserve a specific percentage for the domestic market. Once introduced, the scheme will significantly increase dwindling east coast supplies.

The gas security incentive is a strategic move to encourage producers to offer more gas on the domestic market. It will likely work by levying a charge to gas exports, excluding those under long-term contract. The charge is, however, a temporary measure and when a producer fulfils its annual obligation to supply gas to the domestic market, the levy will be returned to them.

The scheme is likely to include competitive domestic pricing to ensure domestic purchasers can buy gas at prices that reflect the cost of production rather than the substantially higher international export prices. This is likely to stabilise gas prices and significantly reduce our dependence on volatile international markets.

Who bears the cost?

Gas producers are not likely to be happy, given they will have to sell gas more cheaply. The peak oil, gas and coal body, Australian Energy Producers, has previously warned against interventionist policies such as mandatory reservation schemes. It says there is a risk of undermining investor confidence and discouraging exploration and production.

The government doesn’t seem concerned about these claims. Rising energy prices have a political cost. Well-designed mandatory reservation scheme will go some way to tackling cost-of-living issues by improving domestic supply security and alleviating some price pressures.

It makes sense to take advantage of Australia’s enormous gas reserves and tackle the looming shortfall and pricing concerns. Disconnecting the domestic east coast market from global LNG price volatility is rational.

Ideally, the forthcoming scheme will form just part of a broader structural overhaul of the gas market including infrastructure, contracting, investment incentives and demand-management reforms.

Samantha Hepburn, Professor of Law, Deakin University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

It often seems like a great idea at the time. There’s a streaming service or premium version of an app you want to try, offering a “no strings attached” free trial.

You sign up – with a few easy clicks and your credit card. The trial period passes, and for whatever reason, you decide this product isn’t for you.

But when you try to cancel, you’re forced to navigate confusing web pages, asked whether you’re “really sure about this” an unreasonable number of times, or even told to call a generic customer hotline.

Sound familiar? According to the Consumer Policy Research Centre, three in four Australians with subscriptions have had a negative experience when trying to cancel them.

Making it hard to cancel – commonly called a “subscription trap” – isn’t currently illegal. But now the federal government has announced a plan to ban subscription traps and other hidden fees.

Easy to sign up, tricky to leave

Subscription traps are sometimes referred to as the “Hotel California” problem, referencing the famous 1977 song by US rock band The Eagles.

Echoing that song’s lyrics, while it is often easy to sign up – it can be really hard to leave.

The traps can take many different forms. One example is when consumers sign up for a service quickly and easily online, but can only cancel on the phone (sometimes needing to ring another country).

Delay, delay, delay

Announcing the proposed new laws at a press conference, Assistant Minister for Competition Andrew Leigh also singled out cases where the cancellation takes 28 days to come into effect. Leigh said:

A simple rule for businesses: if you can’t cancel a subscription through the same process that you started the subscription, then perhaps there’s a subscription trap going on.

Another example, known as “confirm shaming”, involves requiring consumers to click through multiple screens before they can cancel.

Typically, each of those screens has a message asking consumers to reconsider, often reiterating the service’s purported benefits and even offering new discounts on the price not previously available.

Why it’s a problem

Individually, all these difficulties may seem trivial. But cumulatively they are problematic.

Consumers are spending time trying to cancel subscriptions for services they don’t use and businesses are making money from services consumers don’t want.

Consumers are also being locked into those services by artificially created friction and techniques that rely on triggering uncertainty or doubt – “do you really want to cancel?”

The proposed new laws will ask the process of cancelling to be straightforward.

What new laws are proposed in Australia?

The proposed ban on subscription traps is part of a broader package of federal law reforms targeting unfair trading.

Consultation on a draft of the new law is set to take place in 2026 (following an earlier consultation in 2024).

The federal government has indicated the law will include a general ban on unfair practices that manipulate consumer decision making, while also targeting specific deceptive practices, such as certain kinds of subscription traps.

It should not apply to the kinds of subscription where there are legitimate reasons for slowing down the cancellation process, for example, where pushing the wrong button might delete all your photos or digital content.

What do other countries do?

Several other jurisdictions already have responses to subscription traps.

Californian law now includes a suite of protections for consumers, including requiring notice:

• of automatic renewal
• at the end of a free charge period before a fee is incurred.

California’s “click to cancel” rules also mean consumers must be able to cancel using the same method of communication they used to subscribe. And businesses must offer consumers information on how to cancel.

In the European Union, rules on unfair commercial practices have led to changes in the previously complicated process required to unsubscribe from Amazon Prime – reducing cancelling a subscription to just two clicks.

In the meantime what should Australians do to manage subscriptions?

Until Australia gets its own unfair business practices law, Australians can protect themselves from being trapped by subscriptions.

But it takes some work, including recording important information at the time you subscribe:

• if there is a free trial, make a note of when that expires and remember to cancel before being charged a fee
• take a screen shot of what you were promised and the price – if what is delivered is different from what was promised you should be able to cancel at any time for a refund
• record contact details for the service provider at the time you sign up.

Above all, persevere in cancelling subscriptions you don’t want. Remember, those pleading messages such as “why cancel?” or “don’t leave us” are designed to manipulate your emotions. So try to ignore them.

Jeannie Marie Paterson, Professor of Law (consumer protections and credit law), The University of Melbourne

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The rapid expansion of artificial intelligence and cloud services has led to a massive demand for computing power. The surge has strained data infrastructure, which requires lots of electricity to operate. A single, medium-sized data center here on Earth can consume enough electricity to power about 16,500 homes, with even larger facilities using as much as a small city.

Over the past few years, tech leaders have increasingly advocated for space-based AI infrastructure as a way to address the power requirements of data centers.

In space, sunshine – which solar panels can convert into electricity – is abundant and reliable. On Nov. 4, 2025, Google unveiled Project Suncatcher, a bold proposal to launch an 81-satellite constellation into low Earth orbit. It plans to use the constellation to harvest sunlight to power the next generation of AI data centers in space. So, instead of beaming power back to Earth, the constellation would beam data back to Earth.

For example, if you asked a chatbot how to bake sourdough bread, instead of firing up a data center in Virginia to craft a response, your query would be beamed up to the constellation in space, processed by chips running purely on solar energy, and the recipe sent back down to your device. Doing so would mean leaving the substantial heat generated behind in the cold vacuum of space.

As a technology entrepreneur, I applaud Google’s ambitious plan. But as a space scientist, I predict that the company will soon have to reckon with a growing problem: space debris.

The mathematics of disaster

Space debris – the collection of defunct human-made objects in Earth’s orbit – is already affecting space agencies, companies and astronauts. This debris includes large pieces, such as spent rocket stages and dead satellites, as well as tiny flecks of paint and other fragments from discontinued satellites.

Space debris travels at hypersonic speeds of approximately 17,500 miles per hour (28,000 km/h) in low Earth orbit. At this speed, colliding with a piece of debris the size of a blueberry would feel like being hit by a falling anvil.

Satellite breakups and anti-satellite tests have created an alarming amount of debris, a crisis now exacerbated by the rapid expansion of commercial constellations such as SpaceX’s Starlink. The Starlink network has more than 7,500 satellites, which provide global high-speed internet.

The U.S. Space Force actively tracks over 40,000 objects larger than a softball using ground-based radar and optical telescopes. However, this number represents less than 1% of the lethal objects in orbit. The majority are too small for these telescopes to reliably identify and track.

In November 2025, three Chinese astronauts aboard the Tiangong space station were forced to delay their return to Earth because their capsule had been struck by a piece of space debris. Back in 2018, a similar incident on the International Space Station challenged relations between the United States and Russia, as Russian media speculated that a NASA astronaut may have deliberately sabotaged the station.

The orbital shell Google’s project targets – a Sun-synchronous orbit approximately 400 miles (650 kilometers) above Earth – is a prime location for uninterrupted solar energy. At this orbit, the spacecraft’s solar arrays will always be in direct sunshine, where they can generate electricity to power the onboard AI payload. But for this reason, Sun-synchronous orbit is also the single most congested highway in low Earth orbit, and objects in this orbit are the most likely to collide with other satellites or debris.

As new objects arrive and existing objects break apart, low Earth orbit could approach Kessler syndrome. In this theory, once the number of objects in low Earth orbit exceeds a critical threshold, collisions between objects generate a cascade of new debris. Eventually, this cascade of collisions could render certain orbits entirely unusable.

Implications for Project Suncatcher

Project Suncatcher proposes a cluster of satellites carrying large solar panels. They would fly with a radius of just one kilometer, each node spaced less than 200 meters apart. To put that in perspective, imagine a racetrack roughly the size of the Daytona International Speedway, where 81 cars race at 17,500 miles per hour – while separated by gaps about the distance you need to safely brake on the highway.

This ultradense formation is necessary for the satellites to transmit data to each other. The constellation splits complex AI workloads across all its 81 units, enabling them to “think” and process data simultaneously as a single, massive, distributed brain. Google is partnering with a space company to launch two prototype satellites by early 2027 to validate the hardware.

But in the vacuum of space, flying in formation is a constant battle against physics. While the atmosphere in low Earth orbit is incredibly thin, it is not empty. Sparse air particles create orbital drag on satellites – this force pushes against the spacecraft, slowing it down and forcing it to drop in altitude. Satellites with large surface areas have more issues with drag, as they can act like a sail catching the wind.

To add to this complexity, streams of particles and magnetic fields from the Sun – known as space weather – can cause the density of air particles in low Earth orbit to fluctuate in unpredictable ways. These fluctuations directly affect orbital drag.

When satellites are spaced less than 200 meters apart, the margin for error evaporates. A single impact could not only destroy one satellite but send it blasting into its neighbors, triggering a cascade that could wipe out the entire cluster and randomly scatter millions of new pieces of debris into an orbit that is already a minefield.

The importance of active avoidance

To prevent crashes and cascades, satellite companies could adopt a leave no trace standard, which means designing satellites that do not fragment, release debris or endanger their neighbors, and that can be safely removed from orbit. For a constellation as dense and intricate as Suncatcher, meeting this standard might require equipping the satellites with “reflexes” that autonomously detect and dance through a debris field. Suncatcher’s current design doesn’t include these active avoidance capabilities.

In the first six months of 2025 alone, SpaceX’s Starlink constellation performed a staggering 144,404 collision-avoidance maneuvers to dodge debris and other spacecraft. Similarly, Suncatcher would likely encounter debris larger than a grain of sand every five seconds.

Today’s object-tracking infrastructure is generally limited to debris larger than a softball, leaving millions of smaller debris pieces effectively invisible to satellite operators. Future constellations will need an onboard detection system that can actively spot these smaller threats and maneuver the satellite autonomously in real time.

Equipping Suncatcher with active collision avoidance capabilities would be an engineering feat. Because of the tight spacing, the constellation would need to respond as a single entity. Satellites would need to reposition in concert, similar to a synchronized flock of birds. Each satellite would need to react to the slightest shift of its neighbor.

Paying rent for the orbit

Technological solutions, however, can go only so far. In September 2022, the Federal Communications Commission created a rule requiring satellite operators to remove their spacecraft from orbit within five years of the mission’s completion. This typically involves a controlled de-orbit maneuver. Operators must now reserve enough fuel to fire the thrusters at the end of the mission to lower the satellite’s altitude, until atmospheric drag takes over and the spacecraft burns up in the atmosphere.

However, the rule does not address the debris already in space, nor any future debris, from accidents or mishaps. To tackle these issues, some policymakers have proposed a use-tax for space debris removal.

A use-tax or orbital-use fee would charge satellite operators a levy based on the orbital stress their constellation imposes, much like larger or heavier vehicles paying greater fees to use public roads. These funds would finance active debris removal missions, which capture and remove the most dangerous pieces of junk.

Avoiding collisions is a temporary technical fix, not a long-term solution to the space debris problem. As some companies look to space as a new home for data centers, and others continue to send satellite constellations into orbit, new policies and active debris removal programs can help keep low Earth orbit open for business.

Mojtaba Akhavan-Tafti, Associate Research Scientist, University of Michigan

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Trust is not something a company can buy, borrow or barter. It has to be earned, then guarded. Roy Morgan’s latest national survey charts which brands managed that feat in 2025 and which ones fell further behind.

The 2025 results confirm a familiar leader, shifting fortunes for major banks and a sharp fall from grace for several online retailers whose rise in popularity has been matched only by a rise in distrust.

Banks bounce back into trusted territory

Australia’s biggest banks spent much of the past decade clawing back public confidence. The latest Roy Morgan figures show that effort is finally paying off. Commonwealth Bank jumped two places to land in the top five trusted brands for the first time. Westpac climbed five spots to reach fourteenth.

NAB edged higher to nineteenth. ING returned to the top twenty in twentieth place. Bendigo Bank held steady in fifteenth. The banking industry as a whole moved into net trust for the first time in years, rising ten industry-ranking places in one quarter, an unusually fast shift in sentiment.

Physical retail shines, as online retail Shein's itself

Shoppers continue to give brick and mortar retailers the benefit of the doubt. Bunnings retained its crown as Australia’s most trusted brand for an eighth straight quarter. There's a reason it's one of the only Aussie stores to ever score its own spot in the famed kids show Bluey.

Meanwhile, Aldi held second, and Kmart stayed third to round off the podium.

Big W remained in the top ten, slipping only one place to seventh. JB Hi Fi and Myer again featured among the country’s most trusted names. No wonder, seeing as how physical stores - despite falling sales - are seen as reliable, consistent and transparent.

Online marketplaces tell a different story. Temu’s distrust worsened to make it the fifth most distrusted brand over the year. Amazon fell one place to tenth most distrusted. Shein slid to eleventh. Their reputations are being dragged down by concerns about poor quality goods, a lack of ethics, profit driven behaviour and unreliable service. Roy Morgan noted that the more Australians use these platforms the faster their distrust grows, a trend that has accelerated through 2025. Honestly? Thank God. The fewer folks using them the better, says I.

The top 10s

Who doesn't love a top ten list?

Australia’s most trusted brands in 2025

Bunnings stayed in first place. It has led the national trust rankings for eight consecutive quarters, so its position is unchanged. Aldi held second without movement. Kmart stayed in third, continuing a four quarter run in that position. Apple remained in fourth with no change. Commonwealth Bank rose two places into fifth, its highest result on record. Toyota slipped one position to sixth, pushed out of the top five by CBA’s rise. Big W fell one place to seventh. Coles held eighth without change. Woolworths held ninth. Australia Post slipped one place to tenth.

Australia’s most distrusted brands in 2025

Screenshot

Everyone hates the duopoly, it seems. Woolworths again ranked as the most distrusted brand in Australia. Coles remained in second, with both supermarkets holding their positions for a fourth straight quarter.

Online fast-fashion retailer and international bad guy, Temu, deteriorated one place to become the fifth most distrusted brand on a twelve month view, although it ranked as the single most distrusted brand for the month of September.

Speaking of villains, Tesla slipped one place to seventh.

2025 market-darling Telstra improved one place to eighth. Amazon meanwhile fell one place to tenth.

Outside of the top 10, Shein worsened one place to eleventh. McDonald’s deteriorated two places to sixteenth. Jetstar dropped three places to eighteenth. Shell slipped one place to nineteenth, while BP improved one place to twentieth. News Corp rose two places to twelfth.

Rio Tinto climbed one place to seventeenth.

It seems President Trump has been paying closer attention to Australia than some of us might have given him credit for. He told reporters on Wednesday that his Administration is looking at the Australian-style superannuation system to fund retirement as a way of lifting the nation's rapidly declining birth rate.

Implementing superannuation schemes in America would be a right-sight better than whatever hodgepodge they've got over there now (as I'll get into). But using super schemes to increase the birth rate? I'm not sure the numbers stack up here for the Donald.

He said what?

The President made the rather off-the-cuff comments in praise of super at an event where billionaire Michael Dell and his wife announced a $US6.5 billion endowment to benefit American kids under the so-called "Trump Accounts" scheme. It's worth pointing out that the donation by the Dell's to America's youth represents the second largest in American history behind that of Warren Buffett to the Bill and Melinda Gates foundation.

Trump Accounts is just one lever the President has pulled to help expand the birth rate in the US. One idea he previously landed on after just retaking office was giving American women who had eight or more children a literal medal for doing so.

Reporters from the press pool asked what else the Administration would be working on to lift fertility rates, and he talked specifically in favour on Australia's  Superannuation scheme.

"We are looking at programs. There’s a certain Australian plan that people are liking and they’re talking about … not for children, necessarily, but it’s for people, working people," adding "we're looking at it very seriously, it has worked out very well.

"It's a good plan," he concluded.

It's no secret the US retirement system is a mess compared to something like superannuation. So how would it work if Trump wanted to switch it up for a more green and gold-style approach to retirement? And what does money when you're old have to do with having kids?

Could superannuation supercharge the US birth rate?

We've currently got more people alive on earth than ever, right now. By 2026 the global population is estimated to be around 8.3 billion folks getting about. Almost 350 million of those live in the USA. 

But despite the big numbers, it's the little ones that has Trump and his Administration concerned. The US fertility rate is now at around 1.63 children per woman as of 2023, and slid to 1.60 in 2024 according to US health data. That's the lowest it has ever been, and it's below the bar for what's known as the 'replacement' birth rate. 

The replacement birth rate refers to the number of kids needed per woman to literally "replace" the generation that came before them while still growing the population. In most developed countries, that number is at 2.1. It's worth noting, however, that the World Bank puts the replacement rate at 2.3 and the UN puts it at 2.24.

But what does all this have to do with retirement accounts and super?

401(K)s versus superannuation: how does the US differ from Australia?

I'm no economist, but from my spot up here in the cheap seats, the system for funding retirement in the US looks like a right mess. 

Talking about super in an American context means talking about two very different creatures. A 401(k) is essentially a voluntary savings account with tax perks. Australian super is a compulsory, whole-of-workforce retirement architecture. They might both be “retirement accounts” on paper, but they behave very differently in the real world.

In the US, a 401(k) only exists for you if your employer offers one, and if you personally choose to participate. That sounds like you're speaking a foreign language to Australians, some of whom have had super since the 1980s. Contributions to a US 401(k) account come from your pay, and sometimes your employer matches a portion. 

As a result, not everyone has super to fall back on in America. Big companies tend to offer a generous 401(k) and a matching contribution as a perk to attract new talent. But small- to medium-sized businesses often don't match contributions or offer 401(k) accounts at all.

Those who do have a 401(K) are then asked to figure out how they want the funds invested. As opposed to the Australian system where many folks simply let a big bank or funds manager sort it out for them.

That's why Trump's praise for Aussie super is kind of weird. He's a lover of the free-market, hater of so-called 'big government, a worshipper at the altar of Wall Street and campaigned on increasing the take-home pay of his constituents. Implementing an Australian-style super guarantee would see less money in the pay checks of ordinary Americans overall.

But weirdness aside, adding financial stability for your post-retirement years - Trump would argue - likely leads to reduced long-term financial anxiety and increases funds available overall at a household level to start or grow a family.

But is it that simple? Looking at our data, I'm not so sure.

Has Australia's super scheme boosted the birth rate?

Former Treasurer Peter Costello once famously and horrendously said on TV back in the 90's that Australian mothers should have "one for mum, one for dad, and one for the country". This was back when he announced the baby bonus back in 2004 hat was designed to similarly lift the local birth rate. 

I can't say that particular turn of phrase - nor its user - influenced anyone to hop into the baby-making process, but stats back me up here.

The ABS says Australia has been below the 2.1 replacement rate since about 1976, and it continues to precipitously fall, regardless of what the government does to increase mandatory super contributions from employers.

The Howard Liberal government upped the super contribution to 9% in 2003, while the Rudd-Gillard-Rudd government successfully proposed a staged rise of 0.5% per year up to 12% starting from 2015. Tony Abbott's government delayed the scheme, but eventually we ended up in 2025 with a super guarantee of 12%.

In the background of all this argy-bargy over super, however, the local birth rate continued to decline. And decline, and decline.

Source: ABS

When Keating kicked off the mandatory super guarantee in 1992, the total fertility rate was 1.89. But that had slumped to 1.76 by the time Howard and Costello gave super a boost in 2003. Admittedly, the rate then climbed until 2007 (1.99) when the global financial crisis hit home. Rates in 2025 - despite a 12% super guarantee - now sit at 1.48. Yep: we're lower than the US which by its President's own admission, is experiencing something of a birthing crisis.

It's no surprise that just tweaking someone's retirement guarantee doesn't immediately have them looking at schools and shopping for prams. Demographers note that things like housing affordability, cost of living, childcare costs and parental leave all contribute far more to the fertility rate than superannuation guarantees do.

But nobody suggested this is a silver bullet, after all. There are many levers on which government can pull, and this is just one such lever. Reducing long-term financial anxiety can go a long way towards benefiting an economy in the short- to medium-term as well as in the long term.

And whether it helps the birth rate or not, it'd likely see many senior Americans (mostly women, I might add) not having to work until they drop dead on the job, or worse, turfed out onto the streets into poverty.

Have at it, Donald.

New polling out today from DemosAU shows that Pauline Hanson’s One Nation party could pick up as many as 18 seats if the election were held today. That is as many as the Liberals hold right now in Parliament. Could PHON become the new Opposition? Here is how it works.

Parliament by the numbers

Labor is already dominating the House of Representatives following its recent commanding election win. Albo's party holds 94 seats in the House of Representatives right now. The Liberal–National Coalition, meanwhile, once the natural alternative government for as long as any of us can probably remember, has shrunk to 43 seats spread across three parties. The Liberals hold 18 seats, the Queensland LNP holds 16 and the Nationals hold 9. Minor parties have just three seats between them, while ten independents sit on the crossbench.

Against that backdrop, the new DemosAU multilevel regression projection lands like a thunderclap. It suggests Labor could climb toward the 100-seat mark if an election were held today. The Coalition would fall to roughly half its current size. And One Nation, which holds no lower-house seats at present, could surge into double digits. The model’s upper range has them reaching 18 seats, which is the same number the Liberal Party currently brings to the chamber.

🚨 NEW: One Nation is nearing striking distance of becoming the official opposition, according to a federal voting intention poll and MRP released today by DemosAU

One Nation would win 12 seats and are within range of 18, while the Coalition risks falling to as low as 21 https://t.co/CfEysXAY2R pic.twitter.com/zbLnZTPqyB

— AusPoll (@AusPoll6) December 2, 2025

This polling begs the question: could Pauline Hanson become the new opposition leader if the election were to be held today?

Could PHON really become the new Opposition?

While Labor or Liberal-National Coalition have held onto both government and opposition for decades, it doesn't mean it has to stay that way. The Opposition is not defined by tradition or history, it is defined by simple maths. The largest non-government grouping in the House is recognised by the Speaker as the Opposition. That grouping can be a single party or a formal coalition.

The key blocker to a Hanson-led Opposition? The fragile Coalition agreement between Libs and Nats.

Under today’s DemosAU projection, One Nation does not come close to overtaking the Coalition bloc as it currently operates. Even if PHON were to win at the upper end of the model’s range, they would match the Liberal Party, not the combined Coalition. As long as the Coalition agreement holds, the three conservative parties act as one parliamentary unit, and that keeps them the Opposition regardless of how many seats One Nation manages to collect.

Still, the projection highlights two important currents. First, One Nation’s vote is concentrated in Queensland and parts of regional Australia, which is why a modest national vote share can translate into a cluster of winnable seats. That same geographic concentration is what makes the Greens competitive in inner-city electorates. Second, if the Coalition parties ever broke their agreement, each would be judged on its seat count alone. A Liberal Party reduced to the high teens would suddenly be competing with One Nation to be the largest non-government party.

The path for PHON to become the Opposition therefore exists, but only through a political rupture on the right combined with a sustained rise in their regional seat strength. Under normal conditions, the Coalition remains the Opposition by sheer weight of numbers.

An independent inquiry has strongly condemned the politicisation of appointments to government boards, declaring present processes have “let down the Australian people” and are not fit for purpose.

In her report former public service commissioner Lynelle Briggs has recommended a very detailed appointment process, with checks and balances, to restore integrity, which would put considerable limits on ministerial discretion.

But the government has rejected much of the constraint that Briggs’ plan would impose on ministers. Instead, Minister for the Public Service Katy Gallagher announced on Tuesday an “appointment framework” that is much looser and allows wider ministerial discretion than Briggs urges.

At a Senate estimates hearing on Tuesday, Gallagher faced tough questioning from the opposition and crossbenchers over the government’s handling of, and response to, the report.

The Albanese government commissioned the Briggs report and received it in August 2023. It resisted pressure from the Senate for its release, saying it was still working on it.

One key recommendation the government has rejected is that politicians and their staffers should not be appointed to government boards within six months of leaving government positions, or 18 months in ministers’ portfolio areas.

Gallagher said the government didn’t believe people should be excluded if they had the necessary skill set.

It will also not take up the recommendation that for six months before the last possible election date, no ministerial board appointments should be made that have not been progressed through the standard appointment process.

Briggs’ inquiry focused on some 200 governing and decision-making boards. Given it was appointed early in Labor’s term, much of the attention looked backward at the Coalition government.

“The extent of what are perceived as political appointments in recent years has contributed to a climate where public trust in government has been undermined,” the report says.

“Too often the practice in recent years has been to appoint friends of the Government to boards, either as a reward for past loyalty or to ensure alignment with government priorities and all too often these appointments have looked like forms of patronage and nepotism that should have no place in the modern Australian society,” Briggs says.

“I found that the current board appointment arrangements are not fit for purpose. They have let down the Australian people, undermined the integrity and effectiveness of the public sector and exposed Ministers to unnecessary risk,” she says.

“They do not provide Ministers with a disciplined and structured appointments process that ensures a broad, relevant, and diverse skill set for their boards. They do not provide Ministers with the support that they need to find the best candidates and make appointment decisions. They do not always provide the best people for the job.

"When the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand found themselves in similar circumstances, they acted to introduce or restore independence to appointment processes.”

Briggs’ detailed model for board appointments would advertise all board positions, and include a range of candidate search and talent management arrangements to improve board diversity and quality.

“The model still provides for Ministers to make direct appointments but puts transparent and clear process around those decisions.”

The report urges its recommended processes be enshrined in a new act of parliament but the government has not accepted this.

Gallagher said in estimates that the government had responded to 19 of the 30 recommendations with the framework, a further three were covered by guidance, three were subject to further consideration and five recommendations were not covered by the framework.

Among the principles set out in the government’s framework is that ministers “have flexibility to implement selection processes suitable for sourcing the best candidates for appointments within their portfolio(s)”.

Independent senator David Pocock said, “It is very disappointing that the Albanese Government has refused to accept the full suite of recommendations from the Briggs Review designed to stop the rampant jobs for mates culture that exists in federal politics.

"I’ve worked hard with all non-government senators to secure the release of the Briggs review. Now it’s clear why the Albanese government was hiding it for two years.”

Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

This week, the Albanese Labor government released the long-awaited National AI Plan, “a whole-of-government framework that ensures technology works for people, not the other way around”.

With this plan, the government promises an inclusive artificial intelligence (AI) economy that protects workers, fills service gaps, and supports local AI development.

In a major reversal, it also confirms Australia won’t implement mandatory guardrails for high-risk AI. Instead, it argues our existing legal regime is sufficient, and any minor changes for specific AI harms or risk can be managed with help from a new A$30 million AI Safety Institute within the Department of Industry.

Avoiding big changes to Australia’s legal system makes sense in light of the plan’s primary goal – making Australia an attractive location for international data centre investment.

The initial caution is gone

After the public release of ChatGPT in November 2022 ushered in a generative AI boom, initial responses focused on existential risks posed by AI.

Leading AI figures even called for a pause on all AI research. Governments outlined plans to regulate.

But as investment in AI has grown, governments around the world have now shifted from caution to an AI race: embracing the opportunities while managing risks.

In 2023, the European Union created the world’s leading AI plan promoting the uptake of human-centric and trustworthy artificial intelligence. The United States launched its own, more bullish action plan in July 2025.

The new Australian plan prioritises creating a local AI software industry, spreading the benefit of AI “productivity gains” to workers and public service users, capturing some of the relentless global investment in AI data centres, and promoting Australia’s regional leadership by becoming an infrastructure and computing hub in the Indo-Pacific.

Those goals are outlined in the plan’s three pillars: capturing the opportunities, spreading the benefits, and keeping us safe.

What opportunities are we capturing?

The jury is still out on whether AI will actually boost productivity for all organisations and businesses that adopt it.

Regardless, global investment in AI infrastructure has been immense, with some predictions on global data centre investments reaching A$8 trillion by 2030 (so long as the bubble doesn’t burst before then).

Through the new AI plan, Australia wants to get in on the boom and become a location for US and global tech industry capital investment.

In the AI plan, the selling point for increased Australian data centre investment is the boost this would provide for our renewable energy transition. States are already competing for that investment. New South Wales has streamlined data centre approval processes, and Victoria is creating incentives to “ruthlessly” chase data centre investment in greenfield sites.

Under the new federal environmental law reforms passed last week, new data centre approvals may be fast-tracked if they are co-located with new renewable power, meaning less time to consider biodiversity and other environmental impacts.

But data centres are also controversial. Concerns about the energy and water demands of large data centres in Australia are already growing.

The water use impacts of data centres are significant – and the plan is remarkably silent on this apart from promising “efficient liquid cooling”. So far, experience from Germany and the US shows data centres stretching energy grids beyond their limit.

It’s true data centre companies are likely to invest in renewable energy, but at the same time growth in data centre demands is currently justifying the continuation of fossil fuel use.

There’s some requirement for Australian agencies to consider the environmental sustainability of data centres hosting government services. But a robust plan for environmental assessment and reporting across public and private sectors is lacking.

Who will really benefit from AI?

The plan promises the economic and efficiency benefits of AI will be for everyone – workers, small and medium businesses, and those receiving government services.

Recent scandals suggest Australian businesses are keen to use AI to reduce labour costs without necessarily maintaining service quality. This has created anxiety around the impact of AI on labour markets and work conditions.

Australia’s AI plan tackles this through promoting worker development, training and re-skilling, rather than protecting existing conditions.

The Australian union movement will need to be active to make the “AI-ready workers” narrative a reality, and to protect workers from AI being used to reduce labour costs, increase surveillance, and speed up work.

The plan also mentions improving public service efficiency. Whether or not those efficiency gains are possible is hard to say. However, the plan does recognise we’ll need comprehensive investment to unlock the value of private data holdings and public public data holdings useful for AI.

Will we be safe enough?

With the release of the plan, the government has officially abandoned last year’s proposals for mandatory guardrails for high-risk AI systems. It claims Australia’s existing legal frameworks are already strong, and can be updated “case by case”.

As we’ve pointed out previously, this is out of step with public opinion. More than 75% of Australians want AI regulation.

It’s also out of step with other countries. The European Union already prohibits the most risky AI systems, and has updated product safety and platform regulations. It’s also currently refining a framework for regulating high-risk AI systems. Canadian federal government systems are regulated by a tiered risk management system. South Korea, Japan, Brazil and China all have rules that govern AI-specific risks.

Australia’s claim to have a strong, adequate and stable legal framework would be much more credible if the document included a plan for, or clarity about our significant law reform backlog. This backlog includes privacy rights, consumer protection, automated decision-making in government post-Robodebt, as well as copyright and digital duty of care.

Ultimately the National AI Plan says some good things about sustainability, sharing the benefits, and keeping Australians safe even as the government makes a pitch for data centre investment and becoming an AI hub for the region.

Compared with those of some other nations, the plan is short on specificity. The test will lie in whether the government gives substance to its goals and promises, instead of just chasing the short-term AI investment dollar.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Jake Goldenfein, The University of Melbourne; Christine Parker, The University of Melbourne, and Kimberlee Weatherall, University of Sydney

Clinton Fernandes has established himself as one of the most original and insightful analysts of Australian security policy. An early career with the Australian Army Intelligence Corps no doubt gave him an inside view of the ideas that influence security policy in this country.

I’m not surprised he changed careers. To judge by this outstanding book, there is little regard for intelligence, much less independence of thought, among the people who shape “Australia’s” strategic outlook.

The scare quotes are merited because, as Fernandes observes, “Australia’s policy planners are motivated by […] a single standard – does something protect or advance US power and Australia’s relevance to it?”

One of the most noteworthy features of Fernades’ analysis in Turbulence: Australian Foreign Policy in the Trump Era and his previous work, especially Sub-Imperial Power: Australia in the International Arena (2022), is his ability to account for policy outcomes by placing them in their distinctive historical and geographic contexts.

For those baffled by the decision to buy nuclear-powered submarines from the United States and possibly Britain as part of the AUKUS agreement, Turbulence is essential reading. A growing number of commentators, including former prime ministers and senior military figures, have questioned the wisdom of what Paul Keating called the “worst deal in all history”. Fernandes explains why AUKUS is an all-too-predictable continuation of past follies.

Supporters of AUKUS have suggested that buying and possibly building submarines is a nation-building project on a par with the Snowy Mountains scheme. But Fernandes makes it clear that, “despite ideologically strident claims by Australia’s leaders”, AUKUS is “a contribution of people, territory, materials, money, diplomacy and ideology to the war-fighting capabilities of the United States”.

The art of ingratiation

Making ourselves useful to our “great and powerful friend” is the default setting for strategic and by extension foreign policy in Australia. It has been for 80 years. As far as policymaking elites are concerned, it is literally unthinkable that we should do anything else.

This takes some explaining at any time, but when Donald Trump is president and many think the US is lurching headlong into full-blown authoritarianism, it looks indefensible and at odds with even the most expansive definition of the “national interest”.

What is more remarkable, perhaps, is that we are no longer alone in our enthusiasm to ingratiate ourselves with the Americans. In addition to an analysis of the AUKUS project, Fernandes includes chapters on the Trump administration’s relations with Europe, the Middle East and China. All of them reflect his breadth of knowledge of the contemporary strategic scene and the potentially catastrophic impact Trump is having on the international order America did so much to create.

The US is the principal beneficiary of that order. That Trump and his hand-picked team of flunkies question this reflects their historical ignorance and desire for enrichment.

Fernandes argues that the Trump administration’s disdain for Europe has culminated in policies designed to make Europe “fit in with US industrial policy, curtail their economic relations with China and help preserve US technological dominance”. As he wryly observes, “this system of paying tributes and protection costs will be familiar to students of past imperial arrangements – and to people who watch films about organised crime and its protection rackets”.

Indeed. The wonder is that Australian policymakers are so in thrall to the US that they appear not to care.

They are hardly unique in this regard, of course. Some countries have no inhibitions – or shame – about their willingness to ingratiate themselves, as Qatar’s gift of a Boeing 747 to Trump himself demonstrates. This was in addition to the US$45 billion investment in American corporations promised in 2019 and another US$10 billion to expand the existing American air base in Qatar.

The US is developing a system of tributary states, but without the sense of common culture and acceptance that made the earlier Chinese version rather more palatable and stabilising.

More importantly, Australia’s historical willingness to do whatever the US wants has seen us take part in pointless wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Fernandes’ book is full of sobering illustrations of our foreign policy hypocrisy. Australia rightly criticises China’s actions in Tibet and Xinjiang, for example, but has been slow to condemn Israel’s actions in Gaza, and has said nothing about the US’s extrajudicial killings in Venezuela.

“Human rights will be ignored or highlighted as needed,” Fernandes concludes – as needed to stay onside with the US, that is. He argues that Australia helps to legitimate America’s imperial project and its goal of controlling the Middle East “through a sub-imperial power (Israel) and protectorates (oil-rich Arab monarchies)”.

Threats: real and notional

For many Australians and for the Trump administration, China remains the principal object of concern. Fernandes uses the debate over “freedom of navigation” to illustrate how misguided and limited discussion of the “China threat” actually is.

As the world’s largest trading nation, China is even more reliant on safe passage for its exports than Australia. As Fernades points out, “the last thing China wants is a war in the western Pacific Ocean, which would disrupt nearly all its seaborn supplies”.

In practice, complaints about freedom of navigation are driven by the desire to spy on China’s strategic assets without being harassed:

The silence over what ‘freedom of navigation’ really involves protects the government from democratic accountability, and from debate as to how Australia’s intelligence agencies and military should be used. These are questions of politics, not military strategy.

Even China’s much criticised military build-up can be understood more easily in a wider context that includes a recognition of America’s perennial willingness to use coercive power, including nuclear weapons, to achieve its ends. Seen in this light the acquisition of nuclear weapons by China seems “rational”, at least when judged by the calculus of great-power grand strategy and the logic of deterrence.

Fernandes is enough of an ex-military man and a strategic realist to take seriously arguments about the need for an independent defence capacity. Indeed, he stresses that “submarines are an essential defence capability for a maritime nation like Australia”.

In this regard, Fernandes is at one with other prominent commentators, such as Albert Palazzo and Hugh White, both former insiders turned critics. They are all more concerned about the possibility of making an inappropriate choice of submarine than whether the submarines are needed or not.

Anyone doubting that Australian policymakers are making the wrong choice for the wrong reasons, should read Fernandes’ detailed argument in favour of “air-independent propulsion” submarines, which don’t encourage nuclear proliferation and have the added benefit of being comparatively cheap.

It really isn’t that hard or expensive to defend an island continent a long way from global trouble spots. New Zealand manages with the bare minimum of expense and equipment, no awkward alliance obligations, and yet remains one of the safest places in the world.

Redefining realism

Credible critiques from the likes of Fernandes are important contributions to a debate that may be gaining traction thanks to the efforts of academics and civil society organisations.

For those of us who think that environmental breakdown presents a more immediate and “realistic” threat to Australia’s security than the disruption of sea lanes, much less invasion, the prioritisation of traditional sources of insecurity looks misplaced.

It is striking that even the most informed analyses of security feel obliged to take on the “realists” on their own turf. The debate still revolves around the most cost-effective ways of threatening to kill people in countries we don’t know much about, a potential defence minister Richard Marles euphemistically describes as “impactful projection”.

Rather than fretting about a possible Chinese invasion, we ought to be thinking about ways we can cooperate with a country that is at least trying to address climate change. The US, by contrast, is not only becoming equally authoritarian. It has become unreliable and disruptive. And it is actively working to undermine existing efforts to address what Trump describes as a climate “con job”.

Such attitudes directly threaten the security of the entire planet. They give comfort to those who would prefer not to act and carry on with self-destructive business as usual.

In Australia, the major political parties are not that far apart on the environment. Projects like the North West Shelf gas development, which will significantly add to Australia’s – and the world’s – greenhouse gas emissions are waved through in the “national interest”.

As the environment disintegrates before our eyes, we really do need to rethink our priorities, especially for the sake of coming generations. If we don’t, the young may inherit more turbulence than they know what to do with.

Mark Beeson, Adjunct professor, Australia-China Relations Institute, University of Technology Sydney

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

It's already December, so it's time to start thinking up those new-year resolutions. But what's in store for the market in 2026? Is the worst of the recent 'bubble'-driven volatility behind us? We asked legendary stock picker Jun Bei Liu from TenCap to weigh in.

Throughout December, we'll bring you expert takes on potential 2026 market trends and outlooks. Each instalment will explore the forces shaping the year ahead, from interest rates and global growth to sector trends, company earnings and risks to watch. Our aim is to give readers a grounded view of what 2026 may hold and the ideas worth considering as a new market cycle takes shape. Stay tuned for more.

Speaking on Switzer Investing TV this week, Jun Bei Liu thinks the market may finally be stabilising after a bruising stretch. adding that we may be moving past the worst of the volatility and into a more constructive phase for 2026.

She frames the recent sell-off as a cocktail of forced selling, fear and positioning rather than a sign that the economic backdrop has collapsed. A key part of that story, she says, was the “deleveraging effect” that flowed out of the crypto and high-beta end of the market and washed through growth stocks more broadly.

In her words, the selling pressure has now started to clear:

“Some selling has eased and last week was great. Now we’re seeing a bit of stabilisation… you are definitely seeing a lot more appetite, interest into a lot of those names that’s been underperforming.” 

For Liu, the real turning point is not just sentiment, it is the shift in expectations around US monetary policy. The Federal Reserve’s language has been enough to nudge markets towards an easier setting for financial conditions into 2025 and 2026, even before any official move.

“The Federal Reserve… set the tone for liquidity. They are talking to whether it’s one rate cut, but they’ve got many to come next year. That tone is very important. Financial conditions will continue to loosen.” 

That, she argues, is the key backdrop for any serious 2026 outlook. Looser conditions globally make it easier for risk assets to stabilise, especially in the parts of the market that were hit hardest in the latest correction.

Her starting point is simple. The recent period has been painful, but it looks more like a reset within a longer bull market than the start of something darker. The opportunity, she suggests, lies in recognising that turn before everyone feels comfortable again.

Australia is holding up better than investors think

While global narratives still dominate local sentiment, Jun Bei Liu argues that Australia’s economy is in much better shape than many investors give it credit for. The loudest voices are still focused on the absence of RBA rate cuts and the occasional chatter about further hikes, but Liu thinks this fixation is masking the facts on the ground.

Australia, she says, is not weak, it is simply different. Unlike the US, where looser policy is now expected, the RBA has held steady because the local economy has been more resilient than the commentary suggests.

Her case rests on what she sees in the data:

“Our GDP growth will do pretty well. Our consumers are doing pretty well… although very value conscious. Corporate activity is pretty strong, corporate balance sheets are pretty strong. There’s big dividend coming back.” 

Put simply, we aren’t seeing the kind of demand collapse or earnings deterioration that would justify deep cuts. And that matters for the market narrative.

Investors may be waiting for a “rate-cut rally”, but Liu’s view is that they’re missing the fact that a stronger-than-expected economy is the actual driver of sustainable earnings growth.

She puts it bluntly:

“No one buys a company because of a rate cut… you buy it because the company is great.” 

The irony, she says, is that investors are treating the lack of cuts as a negative when in reality it reflects a market where households, corporates and sectors like housing and financials are still holding together.

This sets Australia up for a slower, steadier climb rather than the whip-saw moves driven by US rate expectations, and she sees that as an advantage rather than a lag.

The payoff, in her view, is an environment where earnings upgrades begin to outnumber downgrades, even without the adrenaline rush of monetary easing.

The long-awaited rotation into small caps?

One of Jun Bei Liu’s strongest calls is that 2026 will finally bring a broader, healthier rally rather than the narrow, mega-cap-driven surge we’ve seen over the past few years. She argues the conditions are lining up for smaller companies to outperform, driven by easing financial conditions and the simple fact that many of them are now undeniably cheap.

She notes that we’ve already seen flashes of this shift.

“We’ve seen a blip of it a few months ago when people moved from larger to smaller… with rate cuts, the smaller companies are benefiting more from the rate cycle.” 

The logic is straightforward. When interest rates fall or even stabilise, small caps – which are more sensitive to financing costs and investor confidence – tend to recover faster. Liquidity helps them more than it helps trillion-dollar giants.

In Australia, that dynamic is even clearer, she says.

“They also get improvement in investor confidence and they’re a lot cheaper normally. These companies generally do better.” 

Liu thinks 2026 will be the year where the rally broadens meaningfully. Not because the big global tech names collapse, but because other parts of the market finally start to pull their weight.

She sums it up this way:

“Next year is going to be that broadening out of the rally, not just a narrow couple of companies that lead the market.” 

This rotation theme anchors much of her 2026 outlook. In her view, the era of chasing only the most obvious winners is ending, and a more balanced market – one where smaller, cyclically exposed and overlooked businesses contribute again – is the natural next step in the cycle.

In this week’s episode, Peter Switzer talks with TenCap's Jun Bei Liu about whether the market has finally stabilised, what 2026 could look like for equities, and the sectors and stocks now offering value.

Peter also interviews Philip Brown from FIIG in a practical walk through the world of bonds, how to think about yields and prices, and how investors can get started without needing wholesale-level capital.

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